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THE CONSISTENCY STRENGTH OF LONG PROJECTIVE
DETERMINACY
JUAN P. AGUILERA AND SANDRA MU¨LLER
Abstract. We determine the consistency strength of determinacy for projec-
tive games of length ω2. Our main theorem is that Π1
n+1-determinacy for
games of length ω2 implies the existence of a model of set theory with ω + n
Woodin cardinals. In a first step, we show that this hypothesis implies that
there is a countable set of reals A such that Mn(A), the canonical inner model
for n Woodin cardinals constructed over A, satisfies A = R and the Axiom
of Determinacy. Then we argue how to obtain a model with ω + n Woodin
cardinal from this.
We also show how the proof can be adapted to investigate the consistency
strength of determinacy for games of length ω2 with payoff in aRΠ11 or with
σ-projective payoff.
1. Introduction
We study the consistency strength of determinacy for games of length ω2 with
payoff in various pointclasses Γ. Specifically, given a set A ⊂ ωω
2
, i.e., a set of
sequences of natural numbers of length ω2, with A ∈ Γ, consider the following
game:
I n0 n2 . . . nω . . .
II n1 n3 . . . nω+1 . . .
Players I and II alternate turns playing natural numbers to produce some x =
(n0, n1, . . . , nω, nω+1, . . . ) ∈ ω
ω2 . Player I wins such a run x of the game if, and
only if, x ∈ A; otherwise, Player II wins. We study the strength of the statement
that games of this form are determined, i.e., that one of the players has a winning
strategy. For all nontrivial classes Γ, this question is independent of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC); for some of them, however, it
is known to follow from natural strengthenings of ZFC, namely, from assumptions
on the existence of large cardinals.
Recall that the projective subsets of a Polish space are those obtainable from
Borel sets in finitely many stages by applying complements and projections from
a finite power of the space. We are mainly interested in the case where Γ is a
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projective pointclass, i.e., Π1n for some natural number n, but we will also consider
the cases in which Γ is equal to aRΠ11 or a σ-projective pointclass.
1
The study of games of length ω2 is motivated by the folklore result that projective
determinacy for games of length ω implies projective determinacy for games of
length α, for any α < ω2. It is also not difficult to see that Π1n+1-determinacy of
length ω2 follows from analytic determinacy for games of length ω · (ω + n), for
natural numbers n.2
Analytic determinacy for games of length ω · (ω + n) was proved by Neeman
[Ne04, Theorem 2A.3] from a large cardinal hypothesis. Specifically, he assumed the
existence of a weakly iterable model of set theory with ω+nWoodin cardinals, along
with a sharp for the model. In fact, he proved this result for analytic games of any
fixed countable length ω · (θ + 1), from corresponding assumptions. This naturally
yields the question whether his results are optimal, i.e., whether the determinacy of
these long games implies the existence of models with certain numbers of Woodin
cardinals. In light of this, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that Π1n+1-determinacy for games of length ω
2 holds and
let x ∈ ωω be arbitrary. Then, there is a proper class model M of ZFC with ω + n
Woodin cardinals such that x ∈M .
The Woodin cardinals of the model we construct in the proof of Theorem 1.1
are in reality countable. Moreover, the model is a premouse, i.e., fine structural,
and we can in fact construct it such that it is active, i.e., it has a sharp on top.
As a corollary of the theorem and the results from [Ne04], we obtain the following
equiconsistencies, which also connect projective determinacy for games of length
ω2 to projective determinacy for games on reals.3
Corollary 1.2. The following schemata are equiconsistent:
(1) ZFC + {“Π1n-determinacy for games of length ω
2 on ω” : n ∈ ω}.
(2) ZF + DC + AD + {“there are n Woodin cardinals”: n ∈ ω}.
(3) ZFC + {“there are ω + n Woodin cardinals”: n ∈ ω}.
(4) ZF + DC + AD + {“Π1n-determinacy for games of length ω on R” : n ∈ ω}.
(5) ZF + DC + AD + {“V Col(ω,R) Π1n-determinacy for games of length ω on
ω” : n ∈ ω}.
The proof of Theorem 1.1 has two main parts: in the first one, the hypothesis
is shown to imply that for a closed and unbounded set of countable sets of
reals A, there is a fine structural model of the Axiom of Determinacy with n
Woodin cardinals whose set of real numbers is precisely A. In the second part
we use a Prikry-like partial order to force over these models and obtain via a
translation procedure an infinite sequence of Woodin cardinals below the already
existing ones. The proof of Corollary 1.2 is sketched in the final section of this paper.
1The pointclass of all σ-projective sets is the smallest pointclass closed under complements,
countable unions, and projections, where countable unions refer to sets which are subsets of the
same product space. Moreover, we as usual identify R and ωω.
2In fact, an argument as in [AMS, Proposition 2.7] with a more careful analysis of the complex-
ity of the payoff sets (using projective determinacy) shows that these two determinacy hypotheses
are equivalent.
3We would like to thank the referee for asking whether (4) and (5) could be added to Corollary
1.2; see also [AgMu].
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Background. The situation for games of length ω is well understood: There is a
tight connection beween determinacy for these games and the existence of inner
models with large cardinals. Martin [Ma75] showed that Borel games are deter-
mined in ZFC. Contrary to that, determinacy for Σ11 (i.e., analytic) games cannot
be proved in ZFC alone. By theorems of Martin [Ma70] and Harrington [Ha78] Σ11
games are determined if, and only if, x♯ exists for every x ∈ ωω. Martin and Steel
[MaSt89] proved, for each n ∈ ω, that the existence of n Woodin cardinals with
a measurable cardinal above implies the determinacy of all Σ1n+1 sets. Woodin
(unpublished) improved this for odd n by showing that the existence ofM ♯n(x), the
canonical active ω1-iterable inner model with n Woodin cardinals constructed over
x, for all reals x suffices to show Σ1n+1 determinacy. Afterwards, Neeman improved
this in [Ne95] even further and showed that for all n, the existence of M ♯n(x) for all
reals x implies determinacy of all an(<ω2 −Π11) sets. Concerning the other direc-
tion, Woodin (see [MSW]) showed that if Σ1n+1 games are determined, then M
♯
n(x)
exists for all reals x, thus establishing a level-by-level characterization of projective
determinacy in terms of the existence of inner models with large cardinals. Sim-
ilar characterizations are known for σ-projective games of length ω (see [Ag] and
[AMS]). Determinacy for games of length ω with payoff in aRΠ11 is equivalent to
AD
L(R) (see [MaSt08]).
Woodin showed that the existence of ω2 Woodin cardinals under choice is
equiconsistent with AD+ + DC and the existence of a normal fine measure on
Pω1(R) (see Remark 9.98 in [Wo10]). By this and a result of Trang (see [Tr13,
Theorem 2.3.11], case α = 2), determinacy of analytic games of length ω3 implies
the consistency of ω2 Woodin cardinals under choice. In fact, a similar result holds
for ωα Woodin cardinals and determinacy of analytic games of length ω1+α for all
1 < α < ω and all limit ordinals ω ≤ α < ω1. For details see Theorems 2.2.1 and
2.3.11 in [Tr13], as well as [Tr14] and [Tr15].
Further results. The proof of Theorem 1.1 uses game arguments based on tech-
niques from Martin and Steel [MaSt08] and [MSW], tracing back to arguments of
H. Friedman [Fr71] and Kechris and Solovay [KS85] as well as inner model theoretic
methods based on the unpublished notes [St]. The method of the proof of Theorem
1.1 can also be used to show the following two generalizations:
Theorem 1.3. Suppose that aRΠ11-determinacy for games of length ω
2 holds and
let x ∈ ωω be arbitrary. Then, there is a proper class model M of ZFC with ω + ω
Woodin cardinals such that x ∈M .
As above, it is not hard to show that determinacy of analytic games of length
ω · (ω + ω) implies determinacy of aRΠ11 games of length ω
2. Our methods also
generalize to games with σ-projective payoff and premice of class Sα (see [Ag] and
[AMS, Definition 4.1]).
Theorem 1.4. Suppose that σ-projective determinacy for games of length ω2 holds
and let x ∈ ωω be arbitrary. Then, for every α < ω1, there is a proper class model
M of ZFC with ω Woodin cardinals with supremum λ which is of class Sα above λ
and such that x ∈M .
Outline. In Section 2, we establish conventions and recall some known facts about
extender models which will be used later on. Focusing first on the case n = 1,
Section 3 contains the main argument and shows that determinacy for games of
4 JUAN P. AGUILERA AND SANDRA MU¨LLER
length ω2 with Π12 payoff implies the existence of fine structural models of the
Axiom of Determinacy with one Woodin cardinal. In Section 4, we argue that
this fine structural model satisfies DC and AD+. In Section 5, we show how to
obtain a model of ZFC with ω + 1 Woodin cardinals from this model. Finally, in
Section 6 we sketch the proof of Corollary 1.2 and explain how to carry out the
modifications needed to prove Theorems 1.3 and 1.4.
We would like to thank John Steel for valuable discussions related to this paper,
in particular to Lemma 3.8, and for making the unpublished notes [St] available to
us. Moreover, we would like to thank Grigor Sargsyan for his helpful comments on
an earlier version of this manuscript. Finally, we would like to thank the referee for
carefully reading our paper and making several valuable suggestions.
2. Preliminaries
For basic set theoretic definitions and results we refer to [Ka08] and [Mo09].
Moreover, we work with canonical, fine structural models with large cardinals,
called premice. We refer the reader to e.g., [St10] for an introduction, and to
[MS94], [SchStZe02], and [St08b] for additional background. In particular, we will
use Mitchell-Steel indexing for extender sequences and the notation from [St10]. As
in [St08b] we will consider relativized premice constructed over arbitrary transitive
sets X . Let Lpm = {∈˙, E˙, F˙, X˙} denote the language of relativized premice, where
E˙ is the predicate for the extender sequence, F˙ is the predicate for the top extender,
and X˙ is the predicate for the set over which we construct the premouse.
For a transitive set X , we say an X-premouse M = (J
~E
α ,∈, ~E,Eα, X) for ~E =
(E˙)M , Eα = (F˙ )
M , and X = (X˙)M is active if Eα 6= ∅. Otherwise, we say M
is passive. We let M |γ = (J
~E
γ ,∈, ~E ↾ γ,Eγ , X) for γ ≤ M ∩ Ord. Moreover, we
write M ||γ for the passive initial segment of M of height γ, i.e. M ||γ = (J
~E
γ ,∈, ~E ↾
γ, ∅, X), for γ ≤M ∩ Ord. In particular, M ||OrdM denotes the premouse N which
agrees with M except that we let (F˙ )N = ∅. We say an ordinal η is a (strong)
cutpoint of M if there is no extender E on the M -sequence with crit(E) ≤ η ≤
lh(E).
An arbitrary X-premouse might not satisfy the Axiom of Choice, but it can be
construed as an ordinary premouse which satisfies the Axiom of Choice if a well-
order of X is added generically. In particular, every X-premouse M is well-ordered
mod X , i.e., for every set Y ∈ M there is an ordinal α and a surjection h in M
such that h : X×α։ Y . In this article we shall mainly be interested in X-premice
which satisfy the Axiom of Determinacy (and hence not the full Axiom of Choice),
where X ∈ Pω1(R), i.e., X is a countable set of reals.
Throughout this article, we work under the assumption that all premice are
tame, i.e., that there is no extender on the sequence of a premouse overlapping a
Woodin cardinal. This results in no loss of generality, as otherwise the conclusions
of the theorems in Section 1 hold.
In the rest of this section we summarize some facts about premice which we
are going to need later. Most of these can be found in [MSW] and [Uh16] for x-
premice for a real x and they straightforwardly generalize toX-premice for arbitrary
countable sets of reals X . Fix such a set X ∈ Pω1(R) for the rest of this section.
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Definition 2.1. LetM be an X-premouse and let α < ωL1 . Then we say thatM is
α-small if, and only if, for every ordinal κ ≤M ∩Ord such that there is an extender
with critical point κ on the M -sequence, in M |κ there is no set of ordinals W of
order-type α such that every ordinal in W is a Woodin cardinal in M |κ.
If it exists and is unique, we denote the ω1-iterable, countable, soundX-premouse
which is not α-small, but all of whose proper initial segments are α-small, by
M ♯α(X). In this case Mα(X) denotes the result of iterating the top most measure
of M ♯α(X) and its images out of the universe.
We will now argue that under certain conditions there is a comparison lemma for
n-smallX-premice. This will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For premice over
a real x this can be found for example in [MSW, Lemma 2.11]; the argument there
generalizes to premice over countable sets of reals. For the reader’s convenience we
will briefly sketch the main ideas and recall the statements. The following notion
will be important in what follows to ensure that Q-structures exist.
Definition 2.2. Let M be a sound X-premouse and let δ be a cardinal in M or
δ = M ∩ Ord. We say that δ is not definably Woodin over M if, and only if, there
exists an ordinal γ ≤M ∩ Ord such that γ ≥ δ and either
(i) over M |γ there exists an rΣn-definable set A ⊂ δ for some n < ω such that
for no κ < δ do the extenders on the M -sequence witness that κ is strong up
to δ with respect to A, or
(ii) ρn(M |γ) < δ for some n < ω.
For several iterability arguments to follow we need our premice to satisfy the
following property, which, as a fine structural argument shows, is preserved during
iterations. This in turn ensures that Q-structures exist in iterations of a premouse
M satisfying it.
Definition 2.3. Let M be a sound X-premouse. We say M has no definable
Woodin cardinals if, and only if, for all δ ≤M ∩Ord we have that δ is not definably
Woodin over M .
The proof of [MSW, Lemma 2.11] generalizes to X-premice and shows the fol-
lowing lemma. Here the hypothesis that M ♯n(x) exists for all x ∈ R is used to
compare the countable premice M and N inside the model M ♯n(x) for a real x
coding M and N . The fact that the iteration strategies for M and N are guided
by Q-structures ensures that their restriction to trees in H
M♯n(x)
δx
, where δx is the
least Woodin cardinal in M ♯n(x), is in M
♯
n(x) and hence ω
V
1 -iterability suffices for
comparison in this situation.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that M ♯n(x) exists for all x ∈ R. Let M and N be countable
ω1-iterable sound X-premice such that every proper initial segment of M and N
is n-small and they both do not have definable Woodin cardinals. Then there are
iterates M∗ and N∗ of M and N respectively such that one of the following holds:
(1) M∗ is an initial segment of N∗ and there is no drop on the main branch in
the iteration from M to M∗,
(2) N∗ is an initial segment of M∗ and there is no drop on the main branch in
the iteration from N to N∗.
In the statement of Lemma 2.4 the assumption that M and N do not have
definable Woodin cardinals can be replaced by the assumption that M and N do
not have Woodin cardinals; see the remark after the proof of Lemma 2.11 in [MSW].
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There is a variant of this lemma for the case that one of the premice is only
Π1n-iterable as introduced in Definitions 1.4 and 1.6 in [St95]. In this case, the last
model of the iteration tree on that premouse need not be fully well-founded, but
the argument from [St95, Lemma 2.2] (see also Corollary 2.15 in [MSW]) yields
that we still have a comparison lemma.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that M ♯n(x) exists for all x ∈ R. Let M and N be countable
n-small sound solid X-premice which both do not have Woodin cardinals. Moreover,
assume that M is ω1-iterable and N is Π
1
n+1-iterable. Then there is an iteration
tree T on M and a putative 4 iteration tree U on N of length λ+ 1 for some limit
ordinal λ such that one of the following holds:
(1) MTλ is an initial segment of M
U
λ and there is no drop on the main branch
through T . In this case MUλ need not be fully well-founded, but it is well-
founded up to MTλ ∩Ord.
(2) MUλ is an initial segment of M
T
λ and there is no drop on the main branch
through U . In this case MUλ is fully well-founded and U is an iteration tree.
Finally, note that by a standard argument Π12-determinacy, or equivalently that
M ♯1(x) exists and is ω1-iterable for all x ∈ R, implies that M
♯
1(X) exists and is
ω1-iterable for any countable set of reals X .
3. Models of the Axiom of Determinacy with a Woodin Cardinal
Recall that Pω1(R) denotes the set of all countable sets of reals. We consider
models of the form Mn(A), where n ∈ ω and A ∈ Pω1(R). It is not hard to see
that—provided they exist—many of these structures are models of the Axiom of
Choice. Our first theorem shows that, if games of length ω2 with Π1n+1 payoff are
determined, then many of these structures are models of the Axiom of Determinacy
and we can in addition have that Mn(A) ∩ R = A.
Theorem 3.1. Let n ∈ ω and suppose that determinacy for Π1n+1 games of length
ω2 holds. Then, there is a club C ⊂ Pω1(R) such that for all A ∈ C, M
♯
n(A) exists,
is ω1-iterable, M
♯
n(A) ∩R = A, and
Mn(A) |= ZF+ AD.
To simplify the notation we will from this point on only consider the case n = 1.
The general case n ∈ ω can be shown by straightforward modifications of the proof
we give for n = 1 below. For the rest of this section assume that V is a model
of ZFC and Projective Determinacy, i.e., that M ♯n(x) exists for all reals x. Note
that the hypothesis of Theorem 1.1, determinacy for Π1n+1 games of length ω
2,
trivially implies Projective Determinacy since after the first ω moves the following
rounds can be used to “play witnesses for projections”. Whenever we are assuming
a stronger determinacy hypothesis, we will point it out explicitly.
Before moving on to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we recall some basic model-
theoretic facts we will need later. In addition to the language of premice, Lpm =
{∈˙, E˙, F˙, X˙}, we will now also consider the language Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}) resulting
from enhancing Lpm with constants x˙i, for i ∈ ω. For an Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω})-model
4We say that U is a putative iteration tree if it satisfies all properties of an iteration tree, but
we allow the last model, if it exists, to be ill-founded.
THE CONSISTENCY STRENGTH OF LONG PROJECTIVE DETERMINACY 7
M = (M,∈, E˙M, F˙M, X˙M, {x˙Mi : i < ω}) we write M ↾ Lpm for the restriction
(M,∈, E˙M, F˙M, X˙M) of the model M to the smaller language Lpm.
Let M = (M,∈, E˙M, F˙M, X˙M, {xi : i ∈ ω}) for xi = x˙Mi , i ∈ ω, be a model in
the enhanced language, so in particular {xi : i ∈ ω} ⊆M . The definable closure of
{xi : i ∈ ω} in M ↾ Lpm is defined to be the submodel
(M¯,∈, E˙M ∩ M¯, F˙M ∩ M¯, X˙M ∩ M¯)
of M ↾ Lpm where M¯ consists of all a ∈ M such that for some k < ω and some
Lpm-formula φ(v, v0, . . . , vk),
M ↾ Lpm |= “φ[a, x0, . . . , xk] and there is a unique x such that φ[x, x0, . . . , xk].”
For sufficiently nice theories T , the definable closure of a model of T does not
depend on the model itself but only on the theory.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose T ⊃ ZF is a complete, consistent theory in the language
Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}) with the property that whenever
M = (M,∈, E˙M, F˙M, X˙M, {x˙Mi : i ∈ ω})
is a model of T and NM is the definable closure of {x˙Mi : i ∈ ω} in M ↾ Lpm, then
(1) for each i ∈ ω, M |= x˙Mi ∈ R,
(2) NM ≺M ↾ Lpm.
Then NM does not depend on M, i.e., if P is another model of T with properties
(1) and (2), then NM and NP are isomorphic.
Proof. Let T be as in the statement and let
M = (M,∈, E˙M, F˙M, X˙M, {x˙Mi : i ∈ ω})
and
P = (P,∈, E˙P , F˙P , X˙P , {x˙Pi : i ∈ ω})
be two models of T . Since T is complete, M and P are elementarily equivalent
with respect to the language Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}). If NM and NP are the respective
definable closures of M ↾ Lpm and P ↾ Lpm, the natural function ρ given by
the unique a ∈M such that M ↾ Lpm |= φ[a, x˙
M
1 , . . . , x˙
M
k ]
7→ the unique b ∈ P such that P ↾ Lpm |= φ[b, x˙
P
1 , . . . , x˙
P
k ]
for some k < ω and some Lpm-formula φ(x, v1, . . . , vk) is an isomorphism from NM
to NP . This follows from the following observations:
(1) Since x˙i are constants interpreted by reals and T is complete, they have
the same interpretation in M and P , i.e., for all i ∈ ω, x˙Mi = x˙
P
i .
(2) If x ∈ NM, then there is an Lpm-formula ψ(v, v1, . . . , vk) such that M ↾
Lpm |= ψ[x, x˙M1 , . . . , x˙
M
k ] and x is unique with this property in M ↾ Lpm.
Thus, if x ∈ E˙M,
M |= “x is the unique element satisfying ψ[x, x˙M1 , . . . , x˙
M
k ] ∧ x ∈ E˙
M,”
and so by considering the Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω})-sentence “there exists a unique
x with ψ(x, x˙1, . . . , x˙k) ∧ x ∈ E˙”,
P |= “ρ(x) is the unique element satisfying ψ[ρ(x), x˙P1 , . . . , x˙
P
k ] ∧ ρ(x) ∈ E˙
P”,
hence ρ(x) ∈ E˙P . If x 6∈ E˙M, we have x 6∈ E˙P by the same argument.
8 JUAN P. AGUILERA AND SANDRA MU¨LLER
The argument for the other predicates is analogous; hence, all predicates are inter-
preted the same way. Therefore, NM and NP are indeed isomorphic. 
We will now set a general context in which we prove the following two lemmas,
as we want to apply them in both the proof of Theorem 3.1 and the proof of Lemma
3.8 below, for different formulae ϕ.
Definition 3.3. Let X ∈ Pω1(R) and let N be a countable X-premouse. Let ϕ be
an Lpm-formula without free variables.
(1) We say N is a ϕ-witness if, and only if, N is 1-small, sound, and solid,
N  ZF, there are no Woodin cardinals in N , and N  ϕ.
(2) We say N is a minimal ϕ-witness if, and only if, N is a ϕ-witness and no
proper initial segment of N is a ϕ-witness, i.e., whenever P is a proper
initial segment of N satisfying ZF + “there are no Woodin cardinals”, then
P 2 ϕ.
Lemma 3.4. Let X ∈ Pω1(R) and suppose that N is a countable Π
1
2-iterable X-
premouse which is a minimal ϕ-witness for some Lpm-formula ϕ. Moreover, assume
that there is another countable X-premouseM which is a ϕ-witness and ω1-iterable.
Then N is in fact ω1-iterable.
Proof. Let x be a real coding M and N and consider the coiteration of M and N
insideM ♯1(x) in the sense of Lemma 2.5 using ω1-iterability forM and Π
1
2-iterability
for N . Let T and U be the resulting iteration trees onM and N with final models
M∗ and N ∗ respectively. We will show that N cannot win this comparison, i.e.,
N ∗EM∗ and there is no drop on the main branch through U . This implies that N
is elementarily embeddable into the ω1-iterable premouseM∗ and thus ω1-iterable.
Assume first that M∗ = N ∗, there is no drop on the main branch through T ,
and there is at least one drop on the main branch through U . Then M∗ is (by
elementarity) a model of ZF, contrary to the fact that ρω(N ∗) < N ∗ ∩ Ord.
Finally assume, again towards a contradiction, that M∗ ⊳ N ∗ and there is no
drop on the main branch through T . The model N ∗ need not be fully well-founded,
but this does not affect the rest of the argument as we shall work in the well-founded
part of N ∗.
Notice thatM∗ is a proper initial segment ofN ∗ which (by elementarity) satisfies
ZF, “there are no Woodin cardinals,” and ϕ. Therefore, it cannot be that there is no
drop in model on the main branch through U , by elementarity and the minimality
of N . Assume for simplicity that there is exactly one drop in model on the main
branch through U , say, at level β + 1 < λ (the general case is similar: if there
is more than one drop, we repeat the argument). Using the notation from [St10,
Section 3.1], the fact that there is a drop in model at stage β+1 implies thatM∗β+1
is a proper initial segment ofMUξ , where ξ is the U -predecessor of β+1 andM
∗
β+1
is the model to which the next extender on the main branch through U is applied.
So by elementarity between M∗β+1 and N
∗, there is an ordinal α∗ witnessing the
failure of the minimality property for M∗β+1, i.e., the following hold:
(1) α∗ <M∗β+1 ∩Ord <M
U
ξ ∩ Ord,
(2) M∗β+1|α
∗ is a model of ZF with no Woodin cardinals, and
(3) M∗β+1|α
∗  ϕ.
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But M∗β+1 is an initial segment of M
U
ξ , so the same holds for M
U
ξ |α
∗. Now by
elementarity again—this time between N and MUξ—this failure of the minimality
property also holds for N , contradicting the fact that N is a minimal ϕ-witness. 
Lemma 3.5. Let X ∈ Pω1(R) and letM and N be ω1-iterable countable X-premice
which are minimal ϕ-witnesses for some Lpm-formula ϕ. Then M and N have a
common iterate and on both sides of the iteration there is no drop in model on the
main branch through the iteration tree.
Proof. Let T and U be the iteration trees of length λ+1 for some ordinal λ on M
and N respectively obtained from a successful comparison in the sense of Lemma
2.4. WriteM∗ =MTλ and N
∗ =MUλ for the last models of the iteration trees. We
cannot have M∗ ⊳N ∗, by the argument of Lemma 3.4. Similarly, the alternative
N ∗ ⊳M∗ leads to a contradiction, so we must have N ∗ =M∗.
Only one side of the comparison can drop; assume that there is a drop in model
on the main branch through U . The case that the main branch through T drops
is analogous. As in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we assume for simplicity that there is
exactly one drop in model along the main branch through U , say at stage β+1 < λ;
the general case is dealt with similarly by repeating the argument. By elementarity,
M∗ = N ∗ and M∗β+1 are ϕ-witnesses. Moreover, as N is a minimal ϕ-witness, by
elementarity the same holds for MUξ , where ξ is as in the proof of Lemma 3.4 the
U -predecessor of β + 1. But M∗β+1 ⊳M
U
ξ , contradicting the minimality property
for MUξ . Therefore, both sides of the comparison do not drop in model. 
We are now going to define a collection of games of length ω2 which are gen-
eralizations of the game in [MaSt08, Lemma 3]. The argument there goes back
to ideas in [Fr71] allowing one of the two players in the game to play the theory
of a model with certain properties in addition to the usual moves. In the proofs
of Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.8 below we will consider two different instances of
games from this collection where Player I plays a complete and consistent theory
in the language of premice with additional constant symbols.
Before we give the definition of the games, recall that if X ∈ Pω1(R) and M is
an X-premouse, then analogously to the existence of a definable well-order in L,
there is a uniformly definable X-parametrized family of well-orders the union of
whose ranges is M (cf. [St08b, Proposition 2.4]). More specifically, we can fix a
formula θ(·, ·, ·) in the language of premice Lpm such that for any such X and any
X-premouseM, the following hold:
(i) for any x ∈M, there is some α ∈ OrdM and some r ∈ X such that
M |= θ(α, r, x);
(ii) for all r ∈ X and α ∈ OrdM there is at most one x ∈M such that
M |= θ(α, r, x).
Moreover, fix recursive bijections m and n assigning an odd number > 1 to each
Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω})-formula ϕ such that m and n have disjoint recursive ranges and
for every ϕ, m(ϕ) and n(ϕ) are larger than max{i : x˙i occurs in ϕ}.
Definition 3.6. Let ϕ and ψ(x0, a, b) be Lpm-formulae and let Gϕ,ψ denote the
following game of length ω2 on ω: Fix some enumeration (φi : i ∈ ω) of all Lpm({x˙i :
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i ∈ ω})-formulae such that x˙i does not appear in φj if j ≤ i. Then a typical run of
Gϕ,ψ looks as follows:
I x0 a v0, x1 v1, x3 . . .
II b x2 x4 . . .
(1) Player I starts by playing some parameter x0 ∈ ωω;
(2) Players I and II take turns playing natural numbers to construct reals a, b ∈
ωω;
(3) Players I and II take turns, respectively playing sequences of natural num-
bers (vi, x2i+1) and x2i+2 in
ωω, for i ∈ ω. We ask that vi ∈ {0, 1}.
Here vi will be interpreted as the truth value of the formula φi from the enumer-
ation fixed above. This can be thought of as Player I either accepting or rejecting
the formula φi. If so, the play determines a complete theory T in the language
Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}).
Player I wins the game Gϕ,ψ if, and only if,
(1) x1 = a⊕ b.
(2) For each i ∈ ω, T contains the sentence x˙i ∈ ωω and, moreover, for each
j,m ∈ ω, T contains the sentence x˙i(m) = j if, and only if, xi(m) = j.
(3) For every formula φ(x) with one free variable in the expanded language
Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}), and m(φ) and n(φ) as fixed above, T contains the
statements
∃xφ(x)→ ∃x∃α (φ(x) ∧ θ(α, x˙m(φ), x)),
∃x (φ(x) ∧ x ∈ X˙)→ φ(x˙n(φ)).
(4) T is a complete, consistent theory such that for every countable model M
of T and every model N ∗ which is the definable closure of {xi : i < ω} in
M ↾ Lpm, N ∗ is well-founded and if N denotes the transitive collapse of
N ∗,
(a) N is an X-premouse, where X = {xi : i ∈ ω},
(b) N is a minimal ϕ-witness,
(c) N is Π12-iterable in the sense of [St95, Definition 1.6], and
(d) N  ψ(x0, a, b).
If Player I plays according to all these rules, he wins the game. In this case there is
a unique premouse Np as in (4) associated to the play p = (x0, a⊕ b, v0, x1, x2, . . . )
of the game. Otherwise, Player II wins.
Remark 3.7. Rule (3) in the game Gϕ,ψ ensures that ifM is a model of the theory T ,
then the definable closure of {xi : i ∈ ω} inM ↾ Lpm is an elementary substructure
of M ↾ Lpm (by the Tarski-Vaught criterion) by the following argument: Suppose
∃xφ(x) holds in M. Then rule (3) ensures that ∃x∃α (φ(x) ∧ θ(α, x˙m(φ), x)). Now,
the formula φ(x) ∧ ∃α(θ(α, x˙m(φ), x) ∧ ∀β ∈ α¬∃y(φ(y) ∧ θ(β, x˙m(φ), y))) uniquely
defines a witness x for φ(x) (the minimal witness according to the well-order given
by θ(·, x˙m(φ), ·)). Hence, rule (4) can be followed by Player I by playing an ap-
propriate theory T , as then the model N is uniquely determined by it, by Lemma
3.2.
To prove Theorem 3.1, we first need to show the following lemma. We thank
John Steel for pointing out to us that it can be proved via a modification of our
argument for Theorem 3.1.
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Lemma 3.8. Suppose that Π12 games of length ω
2 are determined. Then there is
a club C∗ ⊂ Pω1(R) such that for all A ∈ C
∗,
R ∩M1(A) = A.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that the statement of the lemma fails. Thus,
there is a stationary set of sets A ∈ Pω1(R) such that
A ( R ∩M1(A).
Let
ϕ ≡ “there is a real y which is not in X˙”
and
ψ(x0, a, b) ≡ “there is a real definable from x0 which is not in X˙ and
if z0 is the least real definable from x0 which is not in X˙,
then its b0th digit is a1”,
where a = (a0, a1, . . . ) and b = (b0, b1, . . . ) with ai, bi ∈ ω for all i ∈ ω. This will
only be applied in X-premice M for some X ∈ Pω1(R) with x0 ∈ X and “least”
refers to the least real in the well-order of elements of M definable from x0 which
is given by θ(·, x0, ·).
Consider the game Gϕ,ψ, i.e., after Player I plays the parameter x0, the only
relevant moves are the following: Player II plays a natural number b0 asking Player
I for the b0th digit of the least real definable from x0 which is not going to be in X
and Player II answers by playing a1. Afterwards they continue playing the rest of
X = {x0, x1, . . . } and the theory of a ϕ-witness.
The winning condition in this game Gϕ,ψ is Π12, so it is determined and we can
distinguish the following two cases to obtain a contradiction by arguing that no
player can have a winning strategy.
Case 1: Player I has a winning strategy σ in Gϕ,ψ.
Let W be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substructure Y of
some large Vκ such that σ ∈ Y and let π denote the inverse of the collapse embed-
ding, i.e.,
π : W ∼= Y ≺ Vκ.
Since RW is countable, it follows that M ♯1(R
W ) exists and is ω1-iterable. Since
the set of RW for such elementary substructures W is a club in Pω1(R), we may
assume that
RW ( R ∩M1(R
W ).
The game Gϕ,ψ can be defined in W . Let σ¯ ∈ W be such that π(σ¯) = σ, i.e.,
σ¯ = σ ∩W . By elementarity,
W  “σ¯ is a winning strategy for Player I in Gϕ,ψ.”
Let h be a well-ordering of RW in V of order-type ω. Consider a play of the game
Gϕ,ψ in V in which Player II plays some b ∈ ωω and x2, x4, . . . according to h and
Player I plays according to the winning strategy σ. Every proper initial segment of
the play is in the domain of σ¯. It follows that the real part (x0, x1, x2, . . . ) of the
play, say p, enumerates RW . Furthermore, p is consistent with σ, whereby p is won
by Player I. This means that p determines a Π12-iterable R
W -premouse Np which is
a minimal ϕ-witness.
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Let δRW denote the Woodin cardinal in M1(R
W ). Since we chose W so that
RW ( R ∩ M1(RW )|δRW and since satisfying ϕ for the R
W -premice Np and
M1(RW )|δRW means having a real which is not in R
W , we have that M1(RW )|δRW
is an ω1-iterable ϕ-witness. Thus, Lemma 3.4 implies that Np is ω1-iterable as well.
Let x0 ∈ ωω be the first move given by σ (so x0 is also the first move given by
σ¯). Moreover, let a0 ∈ ω be the first move of Player I after x0 given by σ (and σ¯).
Let τ be the real defined by
τ(n) = σ¯(x0, a0, n),
for all possible moves n ∈ ω of Player II for b0. We claim that τ is the least real
in Np not in RW which is definable from x0. This will be a contradiction, since
τ ∈ W as σ¯ ∈W and x0 ∈W .
Let τ ′ be the least real in Np not in RW which is definable from x0. Assume that
τ ′ 6= τ and choose some n0 ∈ ω such that τ(n0) 6= τ ′(n0). Let q be the play of the
game Gϕ,ψ in which Player I plays according to σ¯ and Player II plays some b ∈ ωω
with first digit n0 and then h as above. As Player I plays according to σ¯ and hence
according to σ, this is a winning play for Player I. Let Nq be the corresponding
model. In particular, Nq  ψ(x0, a, b), i.e. the least real in Nq not in RW which is
definable from x0 has a1 = σ¯(x0, a0, n0) as n0th digit.
By the rules of the game, Nq is a Π12-iterable R
W -premouse which is a minimal
ϕ-witness. Hence, Lemma 3.4 yields (as in the case of Np) that Nq is in fact ω1-
iterable. So Lemma 3.5 implies that Np and Nq coiterate to a common model and
there is no drop in model on the main branch through the trees on both sides of
the coiteration. By definition, both Np and Nq are pointwise definable from RW .
Therefore it is easy to see that in fact Np = Nq. In particular, Np and Nq have the
same least real τ ′ definable from x0 which is different from all reals in RW and by
choice of q, τ ′(n0) = σ¯(x0, a0, n0) = τ(n0), which is the desired contradiction.
Case 2: Player II has a winning strategy σ in Gϕ,ψ.
Let W be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substructure Y of
some large Vκ such that σ ∈ Y and let π denote the inverse of the collapse embed-
ding. Moreover, let σ¯ ∈ W be such that π(σ¯) = σ, i.e., σ¯ = σ ∩W . Since RW is
countable, it follows that M ♯1(R
W ) exists and is ω1-iterable in V . As before, by our
hypothesis we may assume that
RW ( R ∩M1(R
W ).
Let Q =M1(RW )|α, where α is least such that Q  ZF+ “there are no Woodin
cardinals” and Q contains a real which is not in RW . Let N ∗,Q be the definable
closure of RW in Q and NQ the transitive collapse of N ∗,Q. Then NQ ≺ Q. Thus,
there is some real z in NQ which is not in RW such that z is definable in NQ from
some real x0 ∈ RW . We shall ask Player I to begin every play of the game Gϕ,ψ by
playing this real x0. Assume without loss of generality that z is the least real in
NQ \ RW definable from x0 according to the well-order defined by θ(·, x0, ·).
Consider the play p in Gϕ,ψ in which Player II plays according to σ¯ (and hence
according to the winning strategy σ) and Player I plays:
(1) x0 ∈ RW , in the first round,
(2) a1 = z(b0), in response to Player II playing b0 ∈ ω according to σ,
(3) other, arbitrary, natural numbers a0, a2, a3, . . . ,
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(4) some enumeration h of RW in order-type ω with h ∈ V as in Case 1,
together with the theory of Q in the language Lpm({x˙i : i ∈ ω}), where the
constants x˙i are interpreted by the reals xi ∈ RW according to p, satisfying
rules (1), (2), and (3) of the game Gϕ,ψ.
Arguing as before, one shows that the reals in played in p enumerate RW . It follows
that the model NQ witnesses that p is a winning play for Player I, which contradicts
the fact that σ is a winning strategy for Player II. This proves the lemma. 
Remark 3.9. It is also possible to prove Lemma 3.8 with the following variant of
the argument we gave above. Instead of playing a code for a theory via vi ∈ {0, 1}
for i ∈ ω, we could ask Player I to play a (fine structural) code for a premouse N
projecting to ω digit by digit via vi ∈ ω for i ∈ ω. In addition, we can let Player I
play wi ∈ ω together with vi for each i ∈ ω to play another real w digit by digit.
Then we say Player I wins if, and only if, the premouse N he codes satisfies (a)-(c)
in Definition 3.6 where we no longer require ZF in the definition of ϕ-witness, but
ask that w is the minimal (in the natural order on formulae and ordinal parameters)
real definable from x0 over N which is not in X = {xi : i ∈ ω} and that no proper
initial segment of N satisfies this property. Then a similar argument as in Lemma
3.4 shows that if there is an ω1-iterable model with this property, N is in fact
ω1-iterable as well. Now a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.8 above
shows that this game works. Moreover, the same idea can be used to phrase the
proof of Theorem 3.1 below differently.
Finally, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Assume towards a contradiction that we have
M1(B)|δB 6|= AD
for a stationary set of sets B ∈ Pω1(R), where δB denotes the Woodin cardinal in
M1(B). Let
ϕ ≡ “X˙ = R+ ¬AD”
and
ψ(x0, a, b) ≡ “there is a non-determined set of reals definable from x0 and
if Z is the least such set in the well-order relative to X˙,
then a⊕ b ∈ Z”.
This will only be applied in X-premice M for some X ∈ Pω1(R) with x0 ∈ X and
as in the proof of Lemma 3.8 “least” refers to the least set in the well-order of
elements of M definable from x0 which is given by θ(·, x0, ·).
In this case, the game Gϕ,ψ is a variant of the Kechris-Solovay game in [KS85]
(see also the game in [MSW, Lemma 2.3]) adapted as a model game. The winning
condition is Π12, so the game Gϕ,ψ is determined. We will obtain a contradiction by
arguing that no player can have a winning strategy.
Case 1: Player I has a winning strategy σ in Gϕ,ψ.
Let W be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substructure Y of
some large Vκ with σ ∈ Y and let π denote the inverse of the collapse embedding,
i.e.
π : W ∼= Y ≺ Vκ.
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Since RW = R∩W is countable, it follows thatM ♯1(R
W ) exists and is ω1-iterable
(in V ). By Lemma 3.8, the set of RW for W as above with the additional property
that M1(RW ) ∩ R = RW is club in Pω1(R). By assumption, we may thus choose
W so that M1(RW ) ∩ R = RW and in addition
M1(R
W )|δRW 6|= AD.
Note that the game Gϕ,ψ can be defined in W and let σ¯ ∈ W be such that
π(σ¯) = σ, i.e., σ¯ = σ ∩W . By elementarity,
W |= “σ¯ is a winning strategy for Player I in Gϕ,ψ.”
Let h be a well-ordering of RW in V of order-type ω. Clearly, every proper
initial segment of h is in W . Consider a play of the game Gϕ,ψ in V in which Player
II plays some arbitrary b∗ ∈ ωω and x2, x4, . . . according to h and Player I plays
according to the winning strategy σ. Every proper initial segment of the play is
in the domain of σ¯. It follows that the real part (x0, x1, x2, . . . ) of the play, say p,
enumerates RW . Futhermore, p is consistent with σ, whereby p is won by Player I.
This means that p determines a Π12-iterable R
W -premouse Np which is a minimal
ϕ-witness. In particular, Np ∩ R = RW . Since both Np and M1(RW )|δRW are
RW -premice and M1(RW )|δRW is a ϕ-witness, Np is ω1-iterable by Lemma 3.4.
Let x0 ∈ ωω be the first move given by σ (so x0 is also the first move given by
σ¯). Let Z = Z(x0,Np) denote the least non-determined set of reals in Np which
is definable from x0. This exists since Np  ψ(x0, a
∗, b∗), where a∗ is the sequence
of natural numbers Player I plays after x0 in response to b
∗ according to σ. There
is a natural strategy τ for Player I in G(Z)—the Gale-Stewart game with winning
condition Z played in Np—which is induced by σ¯. Let τ be the unique strategy
such that for a, b ∈ ωω ∩ Np,
a = τ(b) if, and only if, (x0, a) = σ¯(b).
Note that τ ∈ W as σ¯, x0 ∈ W and, since the reals of Np are those of W , we also
have τ ∈ Np.
We claim that τ is a winning strategy for Player I (in the game G(Z) in Np),
which will contradict the fact that the set Z is non-determined inNp. Let a⊕b ∈ RW
be a play by τ . Let q be the play of the game Gϕ,ψ in which Player I plays according
to σ¯ and Player II plays b and then h as above. As Player I plays according to
σ¯ and hence according to σ, this is a winning play for Player I. Let Nq be the
corresponding model. In particular, Nq  ψ(x0, a, b), i.e. a⊕ b ∈ Z(x0,Nq), where
Z(x0,Nq) denotes the least non-determined set of reals in Nq which is definable
from x0.
By the rules of the game, Nq is a Π12-iterable R
W -premouse which is a minimal
ϕ-witness. Hence Lemma 3.4 yields that Nq is in fact ω1-iterable. So we can apply
Lemma 3.5 to Nq and Np. In fact, Np = Nq as both are pointwise definable from
RW . Therefore, Z = Z(x0,Np) = Z(x0,Nq) and a⊕ b ∈ Z. Hence, τ is a winning
strategy for Player I, contrary to the fact that Z is non-determined in Np.
Case 2: Player II has a winning strategy σ in Gϕ,ψ.
As before, let W be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary substruc-
ture Y of some large Vκ with σ ∈ Y and let π denote the inverse of the collapse
embedding, i.e.
π : W ∼= Y ≺ Vκ.
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Then M ♯1(R
W ) exists and is ω1-iterable in V . As before, we may choose W so that
M1(R
W ) ∩ R = RW and M1(R
W )|δRW 6|= AD.
Let σ¯ = σ ∩W , so that σ¯ ∈ W and
W |= “σ¯ is a winning strategy for Player II in Gϕ,ψ.”
Let Q = M1(RW )|α, where α is least such that there are no Woodin cardinals
in Q and Q |= ZF+ ¬AD. Let N ∗,Q be the definable closure of RW in Q and NQ
the transitive collapse of N ∗,Q. Then NQ ≺ Q and NQ is ω1-iterable because it
is elementary embedded in the ω1-iterable premouse Q. Moreover, there is some
non-determined set in NQ definable from some real x0 ∈ RW . We shall ask Player
I to play this real x0 followed by some real a and some enumeration h ∈ V of RW
in order-type ω together with the theory of Q (of course, organized in such a way
that he satisfies rules (1), (2), and (3) of the game). Let Z(x0,NQ) be as before.
Since σ¯ is a winning strategy for Player II in the game Gϕ,ψ in W , in particular
σ¯ wins against all plays in which Player I begins by playing x0. As before, there is
a natural strategy τ ∈ NQ for Player II for the Gale-Stewart game inside NQ with
payoff set Z(x0,NQ), namely, the unique strategy such that
b = τ(a) if, and only if, b = σ¯(x0, a).
A similar argument as in Case 1, using that Player I cannot lose a play p as above
because of having played the wrong theor, but only because a ⊕ b /∈ Z(x0,Np),
gives that τ is a winning strategy for Player II in NQ. This finishes the proof of
Theorem 3.1. 
4. Dependent Choices, Scales, and Mouse Capturing
By Theorem 3.1 we obtain a countable set of reals A such that M1(A) is an
A-premouse constructed over its reals and M1(A)  ZF+ AD from the assumption
that all Π12 games of length ω
2 are determined. We aim to show that there is a
model with ω+ 1 Woodin cardinals from this hypothesis. Before we do that in the
next section, we first show some structural properties of this model.
First, we have that in fact M1(A)  DC by the following theorem, which is a
special case of [Mu, Theorem 1.1] (building on [St08b] and [Ke84]).
Theorem 4.1. Let A ∈ Pω1(R) be a countable set of reals such that M1(A)∩R = A
and M1(A)  ZF+ AD. Then M1(A)  DC.
In what follows we argue that, in M1(A), Σ
2
1 has the scale property and Θ = θ0,
i.e. the Solovay sequence is trivial. Assuming AD, recall that
Θ = sup{β : there is a surjection f : R→ β},
and
θ0 = sup{β : there is an OD surjection f : R→ β}.
These properties of M1(A) have proofs similar to those for L(R). E.g., using
[St08b] the scale analysis of L(R) from [St08a] can be done inside M1(A) and
yields that Σ
M1(A)
1 has the scale property. Moreover, as in L(R), it is easy to see
that (Σ21)
M1(A) = Σ
M1(A)
1 . Similarly, (Θ = θ0)
M1(A). In fact, by generalizing the
arguments used for L(R), we can also get that AD+ holds in M1(A) but we will not
need that. We summarize this in the next theorem.
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Theorem 4.2. Let A ∈ Pω1(R) be a countable set of reals such that M1(A)∩R = A
and M1(A)  ZF+ AD. Then M1(A)  “Σ
2
1 has the scale property”+Θ = θ0.
Finally, we also have that M1(A) satisfies Mouse Capturing (MC), i.e., that for
any two countable transitive sets x and y such that x ⊆ y and x ∈ ODy∪{y}, x
is contained in an ω1-iterable y-premouse. This follows from [St16, Theorem 1.5]
(due to Woodin).
Theorem 4.3. Let A ∈ Pω1(R) be a countable set of reals such that M1(A)∩R = A
and M1(A)  ZF+ AD. Then M1(A)  MC.
5. ω + 1 Woodin cardinals
In this section we will use the results from the previous sections to construct
a premouse with ω + 1 Woodin cardinals. More precisely, we prove the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.1. Suppose there is some A ∈ Pω1(R) such that
(1) M ♯1(A) exists,
(2) M1(A) ∩ R = A, and
(3) M1(A)  AD.
Then there is an active premouse with ω + 1 Woodin cardinals.
Using Section 4, for the rest of this section, we fix a countable set of reals A such
that M1(A) is an ω1-iterable A-premouse with M1(A) ∩ R = A and
M1(A)  ZF+ DC+ AD+ “Σ
2
1 has the scale property” + Θ = θ0 +MC.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5.1. Most of the proof
in this section closely follows ideas from Section 3 in the unpublished notes [St].
See also Sections 6.5 and 6.6 in [StW16] for a similar argument applied to L(R) or
[SaSt15]. We start by introducing some notation, generalizing ideas from [StW16,
Section 3] and [SchlTr] to our context. Suppose that A is as in the statement of
Theorem 5.1 and work inside V =M1(A).
The proof of Theorem 5.1 can be split in several parts. After we recall a use-
ful standard fact, we define suitable premice. From these we will, by pseudo-
comparison and pseudo-genericity iteration, obtain models which we can use in a
Prikry-like forcing to construct a model with ω Woodin cardinals. Then we argue
that this model can be rearranged into a premouse on top of which we can perform
a P-construction to add one more Woodin cardinal.
The following standard lemma will be useful later on:
Lemma 5.2. There is a Σ21 scale
~φ on a Σ21 set which is universal for Σ
2
1 such
that, letting T be the tree obtained from ~φ, we have for any countable transitive set
a,
P(a) ∩ L[T, a] = P(a) ∩ ODa∪{a}
= {b ∈ H(ω1) : b belongs to an ω1-iterable a-premouse}.
Proof. The second equality easily follows fromMC. For the first equality, let U ⊂ R2
be any Σ21 set that is universal for Σ
2
1. Σ
2
1 has the scale property, so let T be a tree
on ω × ω × δ21 obtained from a Σ
2
1-scale on U (thus T projects to U).
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Now, suppose b ∈ P(a) ∩ ODa∪{a}. Let z be a real coding a. Then the set B of
all ODa∪{a} subsets of a (coded as a real relative to z) is Σ
2
1(z). By the Mansfield-
Solovay Theorem (see for example [KM08, Theorem 11.1]), either B ⊆ L[T, z], or
B contains a perfect subset. But since B is countable, it is thin. Therefore bz, the
real coding b relative to z, is in L[T, z] and hence b ∈ L[T, z]. Since this holds for
all z which are Col(ω, a)-generic over L[T, a], it follows that b ∈ L[T, a].
Conversely, every real in L[T, a] is definable from a and ordinal parameters. This
is because the reals of L[T, a] do not depend on the choice of the universal set U
nor on the scale on U (this follows e.g., from [Mo09, Exercise 8G.29], see also
[HK81]). 
Fix a Σ21 set U which is universal for Σ
2
1 in V = M1(A) and a tree T as above
for the rest of this section.
5.1. Suitable premice. We begin by isolating a class of models suitable for our
purposes.
Definition 5.3. Suppose b is a countable transitive set. We write
Lp(b) =
⋃{
M :M is a sound ω1-iterable b-premouse such that ρω(M) = b
}
.
Moreover, we inductively define Lp1(b) = Lp(b),
Lpn+1(b) = Lp(Lpn(b)),
and
Lpω(b) =
⋃
n<ω
Lpn(b).
Remark 5.4. Recall that we are working inside M1(A), which is a model of AD, so
the club filter is an ultrafilter on ω1. This can be used to show that ω1-iterability
already implies ω1 + 1-iterability (see e.g. [St10, Lemma 7.11] for details), so that
any two ω1-iterable b-premiceM and N as in the definition of Lp(b) can be success-
fully compared and line up, i.e M EN or NEM . Therefore, Lp(b) is a well-defined
premouse.
In the definitions below, let a be an arbitrary countable transitive set.
Definition 5.5. We say that an a-premouse M is suitable if, and only if, there is
an ordinal δ such that
(1) M is a model of ZFC - “Replacement” and M ∩ Ord = supn<ω(δ
+n)M ,
(2) δ is the unique Woodin cardinal in M , and
(3) M is full, i.e. for every cutpoint5 η in M , Lp(M |η)EM .
If M is suitable, we denote its Woodin cardinal by δM .
Lemma 5.6. Let M be a countable a-premouse and xM a real coding M . Then for
any real z ≥T xM , the statement “M is suitable” is absolute between V and L[T, z].
Proof. Suppose not, sayM is suitable in L[T, z] but there is some η < M ∩Ord and
a sound ω1-iterable M |η-premouse N in V with ρω(N) = M |η such that N 5 M .
This statement is Σ21 and hence such a counterexample would also exist in L[T, z].
By the same argument, if we suppose that M is suitable in V , every such ω1-
iterable M |η-premouse in L[T, z] is also ω1-iterable in V . Hence the statement “M
is suitable” is absolute between V and L[T, z]. 
5In the case where η is not a cutpoint, we refer to the *-transformation in [St08, Section 7].
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Definition 5.7. Let T be a normal iteration tree on a suitable a-premouse M of
length < ωV1 . Then we say that T is correctly guided if, and only if, for every limit
ordinal λ < lh(T ), if b is the branch choosen through T ↾ λ in T , then Q(b, T ↾ λ)
exists and Q(b, T ↾ λ)E Lp(M(T ↾ λ)).
Definition 5.8. Let T be a normal iteration tree on a suitable a-premouse M of
length < ωV1 . Then we say that T is short if, and only if, T is correctly guided and
if T has limit length, then Q(T ) exists, and Q(T ) E Lp(M(T )). If T is correctly
guided but not short, then it is said to be maximal.
As in [SchlTr], we define the notion of being suitability-strict in order to make
the proofs of Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13 below work.
Definition 5.9. Let M be a suitable a-premouse and let T be a normal iteration
tree on M of length < ωV1 . Then we say that T is suitability-strict if, and only if,
for all α < lh(T ),
(i) if [0, α]T does not drop then MTα is suitable, and
(ii) if [0, α]T drops then no REMTα is suitable.
Definition 5.10. Let M be a suitable a-premouse. Then we say that M is short
tree iterable if, and only if, whenever T is a short tree on M of length < ωV1 ,
(i) T is suitability-strict,
(ii) if T has a last model, then every putative iteration tree U extending T such
that lh(U) = lh(T ) + 1 has a well-founded last model, and
(iii) if T has limit length, then there exists a cofinal well-founded branch b through
T such that Q(b, T ) = Q(T ).
Definition 5.11. Suppose M is a suitable a-premouse. We say R is a pseudo-
normal iterate of M if, and only if, R is suitable and there is a normal iteration
tree T on M such that either T has successor length and R is the last model of T
or T is maximal and R = Lpω(M(T )).
As usual, this notion can easily be generalized to stacks of normal trees, but
we omit the technical details. The interested reader can find them in a different
setting for example in [StW16], [Sa13], or [MuSa]. The following lemmas are the
analogues of Theorems 3.14 and 3.16 in [StW16]. The proofs are similar to the
ones in [StW16] and [SchlTr] and use absoluteness as in the proof of Lemma 5.6;
we omit further details.
Lemma 5.12 (Pseudo-comparison). Suppose M and N are countable short tree
iterable, suitable a-premice. Then, they have a common pseudo-normal iter-
ate R such that R ∈ L[T, z], where z is a real coding M and N . Moreover,
δR ≤ (max{δM , δN}+)L[T,z] = ω
L[T,z]
1 .
Lemma 5.13 (Pseudo-genericity iteration). Let M be a countable, short tree iter-
able, suitable a-premouse. Then for a cone of reals z, M is countable in L[T, z],
and there is a non-dropping pseudo-normal iterate R of M in L[T, z] such that z is
generic over R for Woodin’s extender algebra at δR, and δR = ω
L[T,z]
1 .
5.2. The models Rxa. As before, let a be an arbitrary countable transitive set. Let
x be a real such that a ∈ L[x]. We consider the simultaneous pseudo-comparison
of all short tree iterable, suitable a-premice coded by some real z ≤T x. We carry
out this pseudo-comparison while at the same time performing a pseudo-genericity
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iteration making every z ≤T x generic over the common part of the final model.
Note that there are only countably many reals z ≤T x for every fixed real x and let
R− = Rx,−a denote the resulting model. I.e., either R
− is the common last model
of the iteration trees obtained by the process described above, or all of these trees
are maximal and R− is the common part model of one (and hence all) of these
trees. Moreover, let R = Rxa = Lp(R
x,−
a ) and δ = R
x,−
a ∩ Ord.
Lemma 5.14. We have the following properties.
(1) As an R−-premouse, no level of R projects across δ,
(2) δR = δ is a Woodin cardinal in R,
(3) P(δ) ∩R = P(δ) ∩ ODR−∪{R−},
(4) P(a) ∩R = P(a) ∩ ODa∪{a}, and
(5) ω
L[T,x]
1 = δ.
Proof. We carry out the pseudo-comparisons and pseudo-genericity iterations to
obtain R− within L[T, x] in the sense of Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13.
Claim 5.15. The pseudo-comparisons reach a limit stage in which all of the iter-
ation trees are maximal.
Proof. If the pseudo-comparisons reach a limit stage in which one iteration tree
T is maximal, this already implies that all iteration trees are maximal since they
agree on their common part model and thus a short iteration tree U would provide
a Q-structure Q(U)ELp(M(U)) = Lp(M(T )) for T , contradicting the maximality
of T .
Therefore, we can suppose toward a contradiction that all iteration trees occuring
in the pseudo-comparisons are short. Then the pseudo-comparisons are in fact
comparisons and they end successfully using the short tree iteration strategies.
They give rise to a last model R∗ such that every z ≤T x is generic over R
∗ for
Woodin’s extender algebra. Moreover, the main branches through all iteration trees
in the comparisons are non-dropping and we have elementary iteration embeddings
jN : N → R
∗
for each short tree iterable, suitable a-premouse N coded by some real z ≤T x. In
particular, R∗ is suitable, witnessed by a Woodin cardinal δ∗ = δR∗ .
The proof of the comparison lemma (cf. e.g., the claim in the proof of [St10,
Theorem 3.11]) shows that, if a coiteration terminates successfully, the comparison
process lasts at most countably many steps in L[T, x], and so R∗ is countable in
L[T, x]. By construction, x is generic over R∗ for Woodin’s extender algebra at δ∗,
so we shall write R∗[x] for the corresponding generic extension.
Subclaim 5.16. R ∩ L[T, x] ⊆ R ∩R∗[x].
Proof. Recall that Woodin’s extender algebra at δ∗ has the δ∗-c.c. and hence
((δ∗)+)R
∗
= ((δ∗)+)R
∗[x]. Let γ = ((δ∗)+)R
∗
. Consider the countable set
R∗[x]|γ and the model L[T,R∗[x]|γ]. Since x ∈ R∗[x]|γ, we have that L[T, x] ⊆
L[T,R∗[x]|γ]. Now, Lemma 5.2 implies that every real y in L[T,R∗[x]|γ], belongs
to an ω1-iterable R∗[x]|γ-premouse Ny. By taking an initial segment if necessary,
we can assume that Ny is sound and ρω(N
y) ≤ γ. Since L[T, x] ⊆ L[T,R∗[x]|γ],
it suffices to show that every real y in an ω1-iterable R∗[x]|γ-premouse Ny belongs
to R∗[x].
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Let N¯y = PN
y
(R∗|γ) be the R∗|γ-premouse obtained as the result of a P-
construction above R∗|γ inside Ny in the sense of [SchSt09] or [St08b, Section 3].
As the size of the extender algebra at δ∗ is small, N¯y is again a premouse and
by definability of the forcing ρω(N¯
y) ≤ γ (see for example [St08b, Section 3] for
a similar argument). Therefore, the suitability of R∗ yields N¯y E R∗ and hence
Ny = N¯y[x] E R∗[x], where N¯y[x] and R∗[x] are construed as R∗[x]|γ-premice.
Thus y ∈ R∗[x], as desired. 
Since R∗ is countable in L[T, x], in particular δ∗, the Woodin cardinal in R∗, is
countable in L[T, x]. Using the subclaim, this implies that δ∗ is countable in R∗[x].
But the extender algebra at δ∗ in R∗ has the δ∗-c.c., so δ∗ remains a cardinal in
R∗[x]—a contradiction. 
Since all iteration trees are maximal, we have R− = M(T ), where T is an
iteration tree of limit length on a suitable a-premouse coded by some real z ≤T x.
Then R = Lp(R−) satisfies (1) and (2).
For (3), note that P(δ) ∩ODR−∪{R−} is the set of all subsets of δ which belong
to an ω1-iterable R−-premouse. Since R = Lp(R−) these correspond to initial
segments of R.
This also implies that every subset of a in ODa∪{a} belongs toR since ODa∪{a} ⊆
ODR−∪{R−}. For the other inclusion in (4), suppose that b is a subset of a and
b ∈ R. As no new subsets of a are added during the iteration, b ∈ N for some
short tree iterable, suitable a-premouse N coded by some real z ≤T x. But then
N |η is ω1-iterable for every ordinal η such that ρω(N |η) = a as, in these cases,
Q-structures exist. Hence, b belongs to an ω1-iterable a-premouse and hence to
ODa∪{a}.
Finally, (5) follows by the same argument as in the proof of the subclaim since
the assumption that δ < ω
L[T,x]
1 together with (1) and (2) suffices to derive the
contradiction. 
The construction of Rxa depends only on the Turing degree of x, i.e., x ≡T y
implies Rxa = R
y
a. Therefore, we will also write R
d
a for R
x
a , if d = [x]T .
5.3. Prikry-like forcing a premouse. We define a Prikry-like partial order P to
add a premouse with infinitely many Woodin cardinals. Let D denote the set of
all Turing degrees and let µ denote the Martin measure on D. Further, let Dm
be the set of all increasing sequences of Turing degrees of length m and µm be the
measure on Dm induced by the product of µ. More precisely, let µ0 = µ and assume
inductively that µk is already defined on Dk for some k < m. Then we let for any
X ∈ Dk+1, µk+1(X) = 1 if, and only if, for µ0-a.e. d0 and µk-a.e. (d1, . . . , dk),
(d0, . . . , dk) ∈ X .
To define the Prikry-like partial order P, we first define a sequence of premice
along an increasing sequence of Turing degrees. For ~d = (d0, . . . , dm) ∈ Dm+1, we
let
Q
~d
0(a) = R
d0
a
if d0 is large enough so that Rd0a is defined, and recursively
Q
~d
i+1(a) = R
di+1
Q
~d
i (a)
for i < m, if di+1 is large enough so that R
di+1
Q
~d
i (a)
is defined.
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Recall that U is a Σ21 set which is universal for Σ
2
1 in V = M1(A). Now, the
conditions in P are of the form (s, ~X), where
(1) s = (S0, . . . ,Sn) is a sequence of premice such that for some ~ds ∈ Dn+1,
Si = Q
~ds
i (∅) for all i ≤ n; and
(2) ~X = (Xk : k < ω) ∈ L(U,A)
6 is a sequence of sets such that for all k < ω,
(a) Xk is a collection of (k + 1)-sequences of premice, and
(b) (Q
~d
0(Sn), . . . ,Q
~d
k(Sn)) ∈ Xk for µk+1-a.e.
~d ∈ Dk+1.
We call s the stem of the condition (s, ~X). For two conditions (s, ~X) and (r, ~Y )
in P with s = (S0, . . . ,Sn) and r = (R0, . . . ,Rm), we let (s, ~X) ≤ (r, ~Y ) if, and
only if, one of the following holds:
(1) s = r and Xi ⊆ Yi for all i < ω; or
(2) for some k < ω and a sequence (Q
~d
0(Rm), . . . ,Q
~d
k(Rm)) ∈ Yk given by some
~d ∈ Dk+1,
(a) s = r⌢(Q
~d
0(Rm), . . . ,Q
~d
k(Rm)), and
(b) for all i < ω and sequences ~e ∈ Di+1 such that (Q~e0(Sn), . . . ,Q
~e
i (Sn))
is defined and belongs to Xi, we have
(
Q
~d⌢~e
0 (Rm), . . . ,Q
~d⌢~e
k (Rm),Q
~d⌢~e
k+1 (Rm), . . . ,Q
~d⌢~e
k+i+1(Rm)
)
∈ Yk+i+1.
The next lemma shows that P has the Prikry property. As the proof is analogous
to e.g., the proof of Corollary 6.39 in [StW16], we omit it.
Lemma 5.17. Let (s, ~X) ∈ P be a condition and Λ a countable set of sentences in
the forcing language. Then there is some (s, ~Y ) ≤ (s, ~X) such that (s, ~Y ) decides
φ, for all φ ∈ Λ.
Now fix a G which is P-generic over M1(A) and let ~Q = (Qn : n < ω) be the
union of the stems of conditions in G. Write δn for the largest cardinal in Qn.
By definition, all Qn are such that Qn = Lp(Qn|δn) and Lpω(Qn|δn) is a suitable
premouse, so δn is a Woodin cardinal in Qn. Let
Q∞ =
⋃
n<ω
Qn.
Lemma 5.18. The following hold:
(1) for all n < ω, P(δn) ∩ L[ ~Q] ⊆ Qn,
(2) for all n < ω, δn is a Woodin cardinal in L[ ~Q],
(3) Qn = Q∞|(δ+n )
Q∞ ; hence, L[Q∞] = L[ ~Q].
Proof. We show (1), from which (2) and (3) follow. Let us first show that P(δn) ∩
Qn+1 ⊆ Qn; a consequence of this is that P(δn) ∩ Qm ⊆ Qn whenever n < m. To
see this, suppose there is a subset a of δn which is in Qn+1. By Lemma 5.14(4),
P(δn) ∩ Qn+1 = P(δn) ∩ ODQn∪{Qn}. Lemma 5.14(3) implies that P(δn) ∩ Qn =
P(δn) ∩ ODQ−n∪{Q−n }, but this is equal to P(δn) ∩ ODQn∪{Qn} by definability of
Qn = Lp(Q−n ). Hence, we have a ∈ Qn, as desired.
To prove (1), let a ∈ P(δn) ∩ L[ ~Q]. Let a˙ be a term defining a from ~Q and an
ordinal parameter in M1(A)[G]. The Prikry property (Lemma 5.17) yields a k < ω
and a condition (s, ~X) with s of the form (s0, . . . , sk), with n < k, which decides all
6The reason for requiring ~X ∈ L(U,A) will become apparent in the proof of Lemma 5.23.
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statements of the form “ξ ∈ a˙”. By genericity we can choose (s, ~X) ∈ G, so that,
in particular, si = Qi for all i ≤ k.
Claim 5.19. We have ξ ∈ a if, and only if,
∃t∃~Y (t is of the form (t0, . . . , tk) ∧ ti = Qi for all i ≤ k ∧ (t, ~Y )  ξ ∈ a˙).
Proof. If ξ ∈ a, then the condition (s, ~X) is a witness for the displayed equation.
Conversely, suppose there is some condition (t, ~Y ) as in the displayed equation,
but ξ /∈ a. Then we must have (s, ~X)  ξ /∈ a˙. Note that t = s. Define ~Z by
Zi = Xi ∩ Yi for all i < ω. Then (s, ~Z) ≤ (s, ~X) and (s, ~Z) = (t, ~Z) ≤ (t, ~Y ). Now,
let H be P-generic over M1(A) such that H contains (s, ~Z). Then, in M1(A)[H ],
both ξ ∈ a and ξ /∈ a hold, a contradiction. 
The claim yields that a ∈ ODQk∪{Qk} and thus a ∈ ODQ−
k
∪{Q−
k
} ∩ P(δk) =
Qk ∩P(δk), by Lemma 5.14(3). So in particular a ∈ Qk ∩P(δn). By the remark at
the beginning of the proof, this implies a ∈ Qn, as desired. 
Write λ = supn<ω δn and fix any premouse P |= ZFC extending Q∞ in which
λ remains a cardinal. We form a derived model of P . More precisely, working
in M1(A)[G], let S be the partial order consisting of sequences (h0, . . . , hk) such
that for all 0 ≤ n ≤ k, hn ∈ M1(A) is Col(ω, δn)-generic over Qn. The order on
S is sequence extension. Fix hˆ S-generic over M1(A)[G], let (hn : n < ω) be the
induced sequence, and let h be given by h(n,m) = hn(m). We may abuse notation
and identify hˆ with h and with the corresponding Col(ω,<λ)-generic filter over
M1(A)[G], since (δn : n < ω) is definable from Q∞ by the previous lemma.
Using this h, we can build the derived model of P : Write
R∗h =
⋃
n∈ω
R ∩ P [h ↾ δn],
and
Hom∗h = {p[S] ∩R
∗
h|∃n < ω(P [h ↾ δn]  S is a
<λ-absolutely complemented tree)}.
Note that R∗h, and Hom
∗
h only depend on Q∞ and h, not on the full premouse
P , so this notation makes sense. For this reason, we sometimes do not distinguish
between P and Q∞ in what follows.
5.4. Preparation for adding extenders on top. Our next goal is to add the
extenders of M1(A) on top of Q∞ while preserving the Woodin cardinals of Q∞ to
obtain a model with ω+1Woodin cardinals. This will be done via a P-construction.
For this, some preparation is needed— we need to show e.g.,
Lξ[Q∞][h] = (M1(A)|ξ)[G][h]
for some ordinal ξ below the Woodin cardinal of M1(A).
We first need the following lemmas which again essentially can be found also in
[St]. Recall that we have V =M1(A) and write RV =M1(A) ∩ R = A.
Lemma 5.20. R∗h = R
V .
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Proof. R∗h ⊆ R
V is easy to see as each pair (Qn, hn) is in M1(A), so let x ∈ RV
for the other inclusion. Let (s, ~X) ∈ P be an arbitrary condition in the Prikry-like
forcing defined above, say s = (S0, . . . ,Sk). For each n < ω consider
Yn = {t ∈ Xn | ∃~d ∈ D
n+1(x ≤T d0 ∧ t = (Q
~d
0(Sk), . . . ,Q
~d
n(Sk)))}
and note that (s, ~Y ) ≤ (s, ~X). Moreover, since pseudo-genericity iterations are
included in the construction of the premice Rda, it follows by density that for all
i > k, x is generic over Qi for Woodin’s extender algebra at δi. Hence x ∈ R∗h. 
Lemma 5.21. Hom∗h =∆
2
1.
Proof. We first show∆21 ⊆ Hom
∗
h. Let B ∈∆
2
1, so that B is, since Σ
2
1 has the scale
property, Suslin and co-Suslin. More precisely, choose z ∈ R such that B ∈ ∆21(z)
and choose i ∈ ω large enough so that z ∈ Qi[hi] (this exists by the previous
lemma). From T and z, one can construct trees S0 and S1 on ω × κ, for some
ordinal κ < δ21 , such that S0 and S1 project to B and R \B, respectively. We have
S0, S1 ∈ L[T,Qj, hi]
for every j ≥ i. Moreover, by the absoluteness of well-foundedness, if x ∈
L[T,Qj, hi] ∩ R, then
L[T,Qj, hi] |= x ∈ p[S0] ∪ p[S1].
Moreover, if Q is a small partial order in L[T,Qj, hi] (say, of size strictly less
than δj) and g is Q-generic over L[T,Qj, hi], then
L[T,Qj, hi][g] |= R = p[S0] ∪ p[S1],
for (since δj is countable in V ) otherwise there is a Q-generic g over L[T,Qj, hi]
with g ∈ V such that
L[T,Qj, hi][g] |= ∃x ∈ R
(
x 6∈ p[S0] ∪ p[S1]
)
.
However, such an x does belong to one of p[S0] or p[S1] in V and thus it must do
too in L[T,Qj, hi][g] (by the absoluteness of well-foundedness).
We have shown that in L[T,Qj, hi] there are <δj-absolutely complementing trees
S0 and S1 that project to B ∩ L[T,Qj, hi] and (R \B) ∩ L[T,Qj, hi], respectively.
The trees S0 and S1 might be big (in principle κ might be of arbitrarily large
size below δ21). Let M be an elementary substructure of some large Lα[T,Qj, hi]
such that
(1) M ∈ L[T,Qj, hi],
(2) L[T,Qj, hi] |= |M | = δj ,
(3) Lδj [T,Qj, hi] ⊆M , and
(4) S0, S1 ∈M .
Let Sj0 and S
j
1 be the images of S0 and S1 under the collapse embedding for M .
Then, Sj0 and S
j
1 are also <δj-absolutely complementing and S
j
0 projects to B ∩
L[T,Qj, hi][g] whenever g is Q-generic over L[T,Qj, hi] for a partial order Q in
L[T,Qj, hi] of size strictly less than δj .
Claim 5.22. For all j > i, Sj0 , S
j
1 ∈ Q∞[hi].
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Proof. Note that hi is Col(ω, δi)-generic over Qj+1. Recall that by definition,
Qj+1 = RdQj for some Turing degree d. Therefore we have, for such a d, by an
argument similar to that in the proof of Subclaim 5.16 that
Qj+1[hi] = R
d
Qj [hi]
.
Now, by Lemma 5.2, every subset of Qj in L[T,Qj, hi] is definable from Qj , hi,
and ordinal parameters in V . Sj0 and S
j
1 are essentially subsets of δj in L[T,Qj, hi],
so they are definable in V from Qj , hi, and ordinal parameters. By Lemma 5.14(4),
P(Qj[hi]) ∩R
d
Qj [hi]
= P(Qj [hi]) ∩ ODQj [hi]∪{Qj [hi]}.
This implies that Sj0 and S
j
1 belong to Qj+1[hi], which proves the claim. 
It follows that Sj0 and S
j
1 are<δj-absolutely complementing trees in Q∞[hi] since
by an argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.18, for every g which is generic for a
partial order of size strictly less than δj , Q∞[g] ∩ P(δj) ⊆ Qj [g]. In particular,
B ∩ Q∞[hi] is <λ-universally Baire in Q∞[hi]. The canonical extension B∗ of
B∩Q∞[hi] to a set in Hom∗h is in fact unique and consistent with the trees (S
j
0 , S
j
1)
for all i < j < ω. Therefore B = B∗. This proves ∆21 ⊆ Hom
∗
h.
We now assume towards a contradiction that ∆21 6= Hom
∗
h, i.e., that the ∆
2
1
sets form a proper Wadge initial segment of Hom∗h. Since Hom
∗
h is closed under
continuous reducibility and the Σ21 set U which is universal for Σ
2
1 is minimal in
the Wadge hierarchy above the pointclass ∆21, it follows that U ∈ Hom
∗
h.
By definition of Hom∗h, there is some i ∈ ω and a <λ-absolutely complemented
tree S in Q∞[hi] such that, since RV = R∗h by Lemma 5.20, p[S] ∩ R
V = RV \ U .
By Lemma 5.2, the relation
x 6∈ OD{y}
is Π21, so it appears in a section of the complement of U . Using S, we can get a
real x such that x /∈ OD{(Qi|δi,hi)} but x ∈ Q∞[hi]. Then in fact x ∈ Qi[hi] by the
argument in the proof of Lemma 5.18. However, Qi = Lp(Qi|δi), so every real in
Qi[hi] is definable from Qi|δi, hi, and ordinal parameters, which is a contradiction.
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Recall that RV = A. Define ξ0 to be the least ξ > ΘL(U,A) such that Lξ(U,A) 
ZF. Since V |ξ0 is a countably iterable A-premouse, it is easy to see that
V |ξ0 = Lξ0(U,A).
Finally, we have the following agreement between L[Q∞][h] and L(U,A)[G][h]
(as classes). Here we will use the extra condition “ ~X ∈ L(U,A)” in the definition
of the Prikry-like forcing P defined in Section 5.3 to ensure that P ∈ L(U,A).
Lemma 5.23. L[Q∞][h] = L(U,A)[G][h].
Proof. In L[Q∞][h], one can easily compute the derived model of L[Q∞] associated
to h. Thus, using Lemma 5.21, it follows that U ∈ L[Q∞][h]. By Lemma 5.20,
A = RV ∈ L[Q∞][h] and, using L(U,A) and Q∞, one can easily define P and G.
Conversely, from G one can easily recover Q∞. 
This, together with the observation above, has the following corollary:
Corollary 5.24. Lξ0 [Q∞][h] = V |ξ0[G][h].
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5.5. Adding extenders on top. Finally, we use a P-construction (see for example
[St08b, Section 3] or [SchSt09]) to add extenders witnessing another Woodin cardi-
nal on top of Q∞. In Lemma 5.25, we first extend Corollary 5.24 to ordinals ξ > ξ0
in order to obtain an appropriate background universe W for the P-construction.
Using the fact that V [G][h] is a forcing extension of the A-premouse V = M1(A)
by a small forcing, the proof of this lemma is straightforward and similar to the
argument in [St08b, Section 3], so we omit it.
Lemma 5.25. There is a proper class (Q∞, h)-premouse W such that for any
ξ ≥ ξ0,
(1) W |ξ has the same universe as V |ξ[G][h],
(2) for any k < ω, ρk(W |ξ) = ω if, and only if, ρk(V |ξ) = A, and
(3) for any k < ω, if ρk(W |ξ) > ω, then ρk(W |ξ) = ρk(V |ξ) and pk+1(W |ξ) =
pk+1(V |ξ).
Let P = PW (Lξ0 [Q∞]) be the result of a P-construction above Lξ0 [Q∞] per-
formed inside W and let Pξ for ξ ≥ ξ0 denote the levels of the P-construction. The
following lemma shows that P is as desired.
Lemma 5.26. The following hold:
(1) For ξ ≥ ξ0, if X ⊆ Pξ is definable over Pξ with parameters from Pξ, then
X ∩ Q∞|δn ∈ Q∞ for all n < ω.
(2) For all ξ ≥ ξ0, ρω(Pξ) ≥ λ.
(3) P is a premouse and P [h] =W .
(4) P has ω + 1 Woodin cardinals.
Proof. For the proof of (1) note that Pξ is definable over V |ξ[G] from Q∞ since
the translation between V |ξ[G][h] and W |ξ is definable and h is generic over V |ξ[G]
for a homogeneous forcing. Hence, if X ⊆ Pξ is definable over Pξ with parameters
from Pξ, then X ∈ V [G]. We can assume without loss of generality that X is a set
of ordinals and let X˙n for every n < ω be a term defining X ∩ δn from Q∞ and the
ordinal parameter ξ. Now we can argue as in the proof of Lemma 5.18 to obtain
X ∩ δn ∈ Q∞, as desired.
Suppose (2) fails and let ξ ≥ ξ0 be least such that ρω(Pξ) = ρ < λ. Say this is
witnessed by some set of ordinalsX ⊆ ρ, which is definable over Pξ with parameters
from Pξ, but X /∈ Pξ. Since λ =
⋃
n<ω δn, there is some n < ω such that ρ < δn.
This means that X = X ∩ δn ∈ Q∞ by (1). But Q∞ ⊆ Pξ, a contradiction.
Finally, (3) and (4) now follow from this and standard properties of the P-
construction, see for example [SchSt09]. 
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.1 and, by putting the active extender of
M ♯1(A) on an initial of P , e.g., as in [FNS10, Section 2], also the proof of Theorem
5.1.
6. Applications
We sketch a proof of the equiconsistencies of the schemata stated in Corollary
1.2.
Proof of Corollary 1.2. We start with the equiconsistency of (1), (2), and (3). The-
orem 3.1 together with Theorem 4.1 immediately gives that the consistency of (1)
implies the consistency of (2). Now suppose that (2) is consistent, say there is a
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modelM of ZF+DC+AD with n+5 Woodin cardinals. Using a fully backgrounded
extender construction as in [MS94], it is easy to see that M ♯n(R
M ) exists in M and
Mn(RM ) ∩ R = RM . Moreover, as winning strategies for games of length ω on
ω can be coded by reals, Mn(RM ) |= AD. Therefore the argument in Section 5
shows that there is a model of ZFC with ω + n Woodin cardinals. The direction
from (3) to (1) follows from [Ne04], where Neeman argues in Appendix A, using
results of [MaSt94], that the existence of a model with ω+n Woodin cardinals and
a measurable cardinal above them all implies the existence of a sufficiently iterable
active premouse with ω + n Woodin cardinals to which Theorem 2A.3 in [Ne04]
applies.
Next, we argue that (4) is equiconsistent with (1) and (2). First, suppose that
there is a model V of ZF+DC+AD and, say,Π1n+5-determinacy for games of length
ω on R and work in this model. The methods of Section 3 can be used to conclude
from Π1n+5-determinacy for games of length ω on reals that M
♯
n(R) exists and is
countably iterable (see [AgMu] for details). Since M ♯n(R) contains all the reals, it
in particular contains codes for all winning strategies for games on natural numbers
of length ω which exist in V . Therefore M ♯n(R)  AD witnesses (2). For the other
direction, suppose there is model of ZFC in which, say, Π1n+5-determinacy holds
for games of length ω2 on ω. By the results in Section 3, there a countable set
of reals A such that Mn+4(A)  “R = A” + AD. Now work inside V = Mn+4(A)
and write R = A. Note that V is a model of ZF + DC (see e.g., [Mu]). Since
M ♯n+3(R) exists in V , it follows from the proof of projective determinacy in [Ne10]
that Π1n-determinacy holds for games of length ω on R (see [AgMu] for details).
Finally, we argue that (5) is equiconsistent with the other schemata. Suppose
there is model of ZFC in which, say, Π1n+5-determinacy holds for games of length
ω2 on ω. Then again by the results in Section 3 there a countable set of reals A
such that Mn+4(A)  “R = A”+AD and we can work in V =Mn+4(A). As V has
sufficiently many Woodin cardinals, every Col(ω,R)-generic extension V [g] is closed
under x 7→ M ♯n(x) for all reals x and hence satisfies Π
1
n+1-determinacy for games
of length ω on ω. For the other direction we show the consistency of (4). Suppose
that there is a model V of ZF + DC + AD such that, say, Π1n+5-determinacy for
games of length ω on ω holds in every Col(ω,R)-generic extension of V [g] of V . As
RV is a countable set of reals in V [g], M ♯n+1(R
V ) exists in V [g]. By homogeneity of
the forcing, this implies that in V there is a set of reals coding a model with n+ 1
Woodin cardinals which contains RV . This suffices to run the argument in [Ne10]
mentioned above which yields Π1n-determinacy for games of length ω on R. 
We finish this article by sketching the modifications which are needed to prove
Theorems 1.3 and 1.4.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Instead of Theorem 3.1, we now aim to obtain a countable
set of reals A such that Mω(A) ∩ R = A and Mω(A)  ZF+ AD. For this purpose,
we replace 1-smallness in the definition of ϕ-witness (see Definition 3.3) by ω-
smallness. Moreover, we replace Π12-iterability in the definition of the game Gϕ,ψ
(see Definition 3.6) by the notion of weak iterability (also called aRΠ11-iterability)
as in [St10, Definition 7.7]. Note that determinacy of games of length ω2 with aRΠ11
payoff suffices to show that this game is determined. Furthermore, Theorem 7.10 in
[St10] suffices to carry out the comparison arguments used to prove Theorem 3.1.
The proofs in Sections 4 and 5 straightforwardly generalize to this context. 
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Proof of Theorem 1.4. Instead of Theorem 3.1, we now aim to obtain a countable
set of reals A such that there is an A-premouseM of class Sα such thatM ∩R = A
and M  ZF + AD. For this purpose, we replace 1-smallness in the definition of
ϕ-witness (see Definition 3.3) by not being of class Sα. Moreover, we replace Π
1
2-
iterability in the definition of the game Gϕ,ψ (see Definition 3.6) by the notion of Π
1
α-
iterability as in [Ag, Definition 4.1]. Note that determinacy of games of length ω2
with σ-projective payoff suffices to show that this game is determined. Furthermore,
Lemmas 2.19 and 4.3 in [Ag] suffice to carry out the comparison arguments used
to prove Theorem 3.1. The proofs in Sections 4 and 5 straightforwardly generalize
to this context. 
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